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Introduction
In September 1998, Long Term Capital Management (LCTM) avoided bankruptcy when 
a group of its major creditors, meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, worked 
out a restructuring deal that recapitalized the ﬁ  rm. The results of this restructuring, 
and the Federal Reserve’s role in it, can be instructive for thinking about the Federal 
Reserve’s role in responding to ﬁ  nancial crises.
Much of the reﬂ  ection on the LTCM crisis has centered on controlling the risk and le-
verage of unregulated ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, raising questions about improving counterparty risk 
management, regulating hedge funds, and the like. Relatively little reﬂ  ection has occurred 
on the causes and consequences of the Federal Reserve’s involvement in the matter.
This is unfortunate, because the LTCM episode raises many key issues about the resolu-
tion of ﬁ  nancial crises: How far should the involvement of the central bank extend, what 
is the scope of action each of the various players should be responsible for, and what are 
the costs and beneﬁ  ts of the differing options? Because the Federal Reserve did become 
involved, though in a way that committed no funds, the possibilities for both greater and 
lesser involvement were thrown into high relief. By making the various containment 
options explicit, and evaluating the reasons for taking or not taking those options, a reﬂ  ec-
tion on this episode can provide a template for central bankers facing similar questions 
in future crises. 
Background
Perhaps the best brief summary of the events surrounding the LTCM crisis comes from 
Myron Scholes’s article, “Crisis and Risk Management” in the May 2000 American Eco-
nomic Review Papers and Proceedings (Scholes, 2000, p.17), one of the few public state-
ments made by an LTCM partner:
The increase in volatility (particularly in the equity markets) and the 
ﬂ  ight to liquidity around the world resulted in an extraordinary reduc-
tion in the capital base of the ﬁ  rm that I was associated with, Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM). This reduction in capital culminated in a 
form of negotiated bankruptcy. A consortium of 14 institutions, with out-
standing claims against LTCM, infused new equity capital into LTCM and 
took over it and the management of its assets. They hired LTCM’s former 
employees to manage the portfolio under their direct supervision and 
with sufﬁ  cient incentives to undertake the task efﬁ  ciently.
Although the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) facilitated the takeover, it did 
not bail out LTCM. Many debtor entities found it in their self-interest not 
to post the collateral that was owed to LTCM, and other creditor entities POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 19, APRIL 2007
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claimed to be ahead of others to secure earlier payoffs. Without the FRB 
acting quickly to mitigate these holdup activities, LTCM would have had 
to ﬁ  le for bankruptcy—for some, a more efﬁ  cient outcome, but a far 
more costly outcome for society. If there was a bailout, it failed: LTCM has 
been effectively liquidated.
Two rather technical issues have large implications for any discussion about LTCM’s 
bankruptcy. The ﬁ  rst was the structure of the partnership: Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment, L.P., was organized as a Delaware limited partnership, but the fund it operated, 
Long-Term Capital Portfolio, L.P., was organized as a Caymans Island limited partnership 
(House Committee on Hedge Fund Operations, 1999, p. 10). This structure complicated 
any resolution or buyout of the fund, and it is possible that the two entities would have 
declared bankruptcy in different jurisdictions, adding to the complications and expenses 
of the proceedings (House Committee on Hedge Fund Operations, 1999, p. 27).
The second technical issue was related to LTCM’s large holdings of ﬁ  nancial derivatives. 
Bankruptcy usually triggers an “automatic stay” that prevents creditors from seizing the 
borrower’s assets. Over-the-counter-derivatives contracts are exempt from this provision, 
however, and in case of bankruptcy, creditors would be able to terminate the contract, 
taking the collateral for partial payment. Most likely, the creditors would sell the liquid se-
curities, and given the size of LTCM’s portfolio, liquidating all these securities could have 
been very disruptive (House Committee on Hedge Fund Operations, 1999, p. E-6). 
Criticism
The dissatisfaction with the Federal Reserve’s role is perhaps best expressed by Kevin 
Dowd in a CATO Institute paper (Dowd, 1999, p. 1). 
The Fed’s intervention was misguided and unnecessary because LTCM 
would not have failed anyway, and the Fed’s concerns about the effects 
of LTCM’s failure on ﬁ  nancial markets were exaggerated. In the short run 
the intervention helped the shareholders and managers of LTCM to get a 
better deal for themselves than they would otherwise have obtained.
The intervention also is having more serious long-term consequences: 
it encourages more calls for the regulation of hedge fund activity, which 
may drive such activity further offshore; it implies a major open-ended 
extension of Federal Reserve responsibilities, without any congressional 
authorization; it implies a return to the discredited doctrine that the Fed 
should prevent the failure of large ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, which encourages ir-
responsible risk taking; and it undermines the moral authority of Fed poli-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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cymakers in their efforts to encourage their counterparts in other coun-
tries to persevere with the difﬁ  cult process of economic liberalization.
Other authors have made similar points (Altman, 1998).
These criticisms fall into three main categories: Was the Fed’s judgment about the 
consequences of failure prudent? Was the intervention necessary, or were there viable 
alternatives? Did the intervention have adverse consequences, speciﬁ  cally, consequences 
that added to moral hazard? 
 Was the Intervention Necessary?
With regard to the wisdom of intervention, Federal Reserve ofﬁ  cials have admitted that 
the decision was a judgment call, justifying their actions as a way to prevent severe nega-
tive consequences. In his testimony to the House Banking and Financial Services Com-
mittee (House Committee on Hedge Fund Operations,1998, p. 24), Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Alan Greenspan explained:
In situations like this, there is no reason for central bank involvement 
unless there is a substantial probability that a ﬁ  re sale would result in 
severe, widespread, and prolonged disruptions to ﬁ  nancial market ac-
tivity. …. It was the FRBNY’s judgment that it was to the advantage of 
all parties—including the creditors and other market participants—to 
engender if at all possible an orderly resolution rather than let the ﬁ  rm 
go into disorderly ﬁ  re-sale liquidation following a set of cascading cross 
defaults.
In answering a question from Representative Bruce Vento of Minnesota, Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York President McDonough responded (House Committee on Hedge 
Fund Operations, 1998, p. 38): “I think you have to start with the notion that we were 
really very convinced that the American people would suffer in a way that is not appro-
priate for them to suffer if LTCM failed.” Responding to a question from Representative 
Barney Frank of Massachusetts, President McDonough remarked: “I am quite conﬁ  dent 
Congressman Frank, that in the absence of any involvement by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York that Long-Term Capital would have collapsed.” (House Committee on Hedge 
Fund Operations, 1998, p. 44).
The report of the President’s Working Group on Capital markets stated “The near col-
lapse of Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a private sector investment ﬁ  rm, high-
lighted the possibility that problems at one ﬁ  nancial institution could be transmitted to 
other institutions, and potentially pose risks to the ﬁ  nancial system.” (House Committee 
on Hedge Fund Operations,1998, p. viii).POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 19, APRIL 2007
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This is not to say that a systemic collapse was certain, merely uncomfortably possible. 
Greenspan, responding to Representative Frank (House Committee on Hedge Fund Op-
erations, 1998, p. 45), said: 
The issue was in all of our judgments that the probability was sufﬁ  cient-
ly large to make us very uncomfortable about doing nothing.
My own guess is that the probability was signiﬁ  cantly below 50 percent 
but still large enough to be worrisome…
At the September 1998 FOMC meeting, President McDonough said “I believe we did 
the right thing, but I certainly understand why others could say we went a little too close 
to the edge or we went over the edge.” (Federal Open Market Committee, 1998, p. 102).
Alternatives to the Restructuring
The Buffet Offer
One particular concern was that the Fed intervention either directly or indirectly dis-
couraged a bid from a large investor (Representative Vento remarked, “I don’t know 
why we can’t say Mr. Buffet’s name here today,” (House Committee on Hedge Fund Op-
erations,1998, p.37). Patrick Parkinson of the Federal Reserve Board in later testimony 
(May 6, 1999) acknowledged that it was indeed Warren Buffet (p.18)). This offer appar-
ently would have left the LTCM partners with no stake in the ﬁ  rm, as opposed to the 
10 percent stake in the consortium bailout that was eventually accepted. Dowd (1999, 
p. 5) asserts that “The management of LTCM rejected the offer, and one can only presume 
that they did so because they were conﬁ  dent of getting a better deal from the Federal 
Reserve’s consortium.” 
Chairman Leach expressed a similar sentiment at the May 6, 1999, hearing (p.17):
I am very worried about a precedent that has gotten almost no review, 
and that is that this Fed-led, Treasury-endorsed bailout of Long-Term Cap-
ital Management had the effect of putting the United States Government 
in collusion with a group of private parties against a private party alter-
native bid, and that is the only rationalization for Government action, 
was that there was no private alternative on the table. But there was, and 
a very credible one and one that was every bit as secure as the one that 
was put together by the Government.
Mr. Parkinson responded (p.17) with “First, we think it is important to remember that 
there was no Government bailout of LTCM, that as President McDonough testiﬁ  ed before FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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your committee in October, there were no federal funds put at risk, no promises were 
made by the Federal Reserve, and no individual ﬁ  rms were pressured to participate.” 
In his earlier testimony, President McDonough (House Committee on Hedge Fund 
Operations,1998, p.29) acknowledged the concern about the Fed’s intervention reduc-
ing the likelihood of LTCM partners taking the Buffet offer. This he denied, and stated 
(p. 30):  “So to conclude Mr. Chairman, if anything, we made it more likely than not that 
the alternative offer would be accepted.” He went on to state that (pp.30–31)
For us the involvement I described of the “bird in the hand is worth two 
in the bush” is, I think, as close to the edge as any senior central banker 
should ever go, and may be right at the edge of getting involved in a situ-
ation and encouraging an outcome.
I can’t imagine that anything that the Long-Term Capital people would 
have heard would have encouraged them to believe that I was somehow 
saying in any way, “Why don’t you bet on the alternative?”
There is also some controversy about why the Buffet bid was not accepted. Lowen-
stein (2000, pp. 201–202) says the problem was that the bid was formally structured 
to purchase the assets of LTCM, the management company, which did not include the 
portfolio, and that John Mead, an outside lawyer for the group making the bid, withdrew 
the offer. This seems consistent with the account given by President McDonough (House 
Committee on Hedge Fund Operations,1998, p.30):
Several hours later, I was informed by the top ofﬁ  cer of a ﬁ  rm that would 
have been one of the participants in that deal that didn’t work, that the 
deal had not been realized, and that the offer was off the table, and there-
fore the only game in town, other than a collapse of Long-Term Capital, 
was what we now call the consortium deal.
Lender-of-Last-Resort Option
There was, at least conceptually, another option for the Federal Reserve. That was to allow 
LTCM to fail and then for the Fed to undertake the traditional lender-of-last-resort activi-
ties of lending freely on good collateral to banks adversely impacted by the failure. Such 
an approach could have dealt with the liquidity problems generated by the problems at 
LTCM, but it is less clear how it would solve the “ﬁ  re sale” problem in the derivatives mar-
ket. Franklin Edwards (1999) discusses the advantages of this option, but ultimately ar-
gues (p.204) “Was the lender-of-last-resort approach the most efﬁ  cient way for the Federal 
Reserve to provide assistance? Almost certainly not.” At the FOMC meeting on September POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 19, APRIL 2007
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29, President McDonough addresses this issue explicitly, in effect agreeing with Edwards:   
“As I saw it, our intervention was preferable to letting the ﬁ  rm collapse in the belief that 
we were good at damage control.” (Federal Open Market Committee, 1999, p.101).
Moral Hazard
One concern was that the Federal Reserve’s involvement extended the too-big-to-fail doc-
trine. Greenspan and McDonough explicitly denied this in response to a question from 
Representative Maloney (p.62)
Mr. Greenspan: As far as I am concerned, talking about institutions or 
such, I say nothing is too-big-to-fail.
Mr. McDonough: I couldn’t agree more.
Mr. Greenspan: There is an issue here of too-big-to-liquidate-quickly…
In considering the broader question of increasing moral hazard, not just the too-big-
to-fail problem, the two ofﬁ  cials indicated that the shift was at best, minor. Greenspan, 
responding to Representative Bachus (p.52), said: “There are no monies involved here, 
and indeed what occurred was a group of individuals coming together, recognizing that it 
was in their self-interest to prevent the cross defaults from occurring and the bankruptcy 
of LTCM from occurring. I don’t see how that has signiﬁ  cantly, in a material way, increased 
moral hazard.” Also responding to Representative Bachus, McDonough said (p.53): “The 
reason I thought it was appropriate or recommended that we get the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York involved was because we were in such a chaotic market situation that 
the risk to the real economy, the real people, was sufﬁ  ciently high. I agree with the chair-
man that we did increase moral hazard, but we thought it was appropriate.” 
A perhaps more subtle form of moral hazard potentially arose not from the initial 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York intervention, but from future monetary policy. Did 
the LTCM problem lead to a monetary policy that was easier than it might have been? 
In reﬂ  ecting on the matter, the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on Global 
Financial Systems noted the rate cuts in the fall of 1998, but identiﬁ  ed them, particularly 
the cut at the October 15 meeting, as one of the four major factors that “commenced the 
healing process” in the international ﬁ  nancial system (Bank for International Settlements, 
1999, p.9).
Transcripts of the September 29, 1998, meeting show the following. Donald Kohn, in 
setting out the case for a rate cut, was explicit (Federal Open Market Committee, 1999, 
p.79): “Questions about the ﬁ  nancial soundness of a number of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms have inten-
siﬁ  ed in the wake of the near failure of Long-Term Capital Management.” But this was the 
case for a 50 basis point cut, while the committee chose 25. The “seizing up in ﬁ  nancial FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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markets” is mentioned by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Jordan (p.91) as 
support for easing. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Broaddus (p.90) men-
tioned “The huge increase in perceived risk in ﬁ  nancial markets, if it persists, may well 
short-circuit the earlier, mainly favorable, impact of foreign developments on U.S. ﬁ  nancial 
conditions. In this new environment, we no longer have that offset. Bob McTeer will be 
happy to know that I am no longer in favor of tightening monetary policy.”
LTCM was mentioned at the October 15 meeting, a conference call, in which the fed-
eral funds rate was reduced from 5.25 percent to 5.00 percent, but did not seem to be a 
major reason for the move. President McDonough (p.9) gave his opinion: “I believe there 
probably are some skeletons still rattling around closets that have not been revealed yet. 
We do not know. Even the darkest rumors do not suggest anything of the size or shape or 
potential magnitude of LTCM.” 
Academic Work
A small amount of academic work has looked at the effects of the Federal Reserve’s in-
tervention. Using an event-study methodology, Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) look at the 
response of bank stocks to several crises and bailouts. For the case of LTCM, they look at 
the returns of four banks (those in the Datastream retail banking index) that later attend-
ed the meeting at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. They ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cantly negative re-
turns for these banks on the days surrounding the announcement of LTCM’s losses in ear-
ly September, which contrasts with positive returns for banks not exposed to LTCM. This 
suggests that market participants had some knowledge about which ﬁ  rms had exposure 
to LTCM and which did not. It is unlikely that investors knew the full extent of the expo-
sure, however, because the exposed banks again signiﬁ  cantly underperformed other banks 
following the announcement of the consortium deal. Kho et al. conclude (p. 31): “Our 
analysis shows that the market distinguishes well between exposed and nonexposed 
banks when an event occurs….There is therefore no basis for concerns that markets 
react similarly across banks and that banks have to be protected from the markets. Our 
evidence raises important questions, especially for those who emphasize the importance 
of U.S. systemic risks as a motivation for bailouts.”
Craig Furﬁ  ne (2006) obtains some closely related results by looking at the market 
for overnight unsecured lending between commercial banks (the federal funds market). 
Furﬁ  ne argues that when a there is a signiﬁ  cant question about a bank’s solvency, it is un-
able to ﬁ  nd fed funds at any rate, and it is, in effect, rationed out of the market. Had there 
been signiﬁ  cant concern about solvency in early September, when the news of LTCM’s 
losses ﬁ  rst came out, the banks with exposure should have been unable to get funds. Furf-
ine does not ﬁ  nd evidence that investors restricted their lending to the nine banks that 
eventually participated in the LTCM rescue. Thus, while Kho et al.’s results suggest that POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 19, APRIL 2007
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markets understood that LTCM materially hurt these banks’ proﬁ  ts, their solvency was 
not in question. Once the rescue was announced, the banks did face higher interest rates 
for unsecured borrowing, suggesting some increase in risk at these banks, and consistent 
with the negative stock returns noted by Kho et al. Governor Meyer uttered a similar con-
clusion in testimony on March 24, 1999, “Our reviews indicated and the ﬁ  nancial results 
illustrate that, while the LTCM incident and other episodes over the past two years may 
have signiﬁ  cantly impacted earnings, they did not threaten the solvency of any U.S. com-
mercial banking institution.”
Of perhaps greater interest, though, is Furﬁ  ne’s ﬁ  nding that the interest rate charged 
to large complex banking organizations decreased after the announcement of the LTCM 
resolution. This indicates a market judgment that these banks became safer. He indicates 
two possible interpretations. The one is that by revealing themselves as less exposed to 
LTCM, the trading strategies of these banks were thought safer, whereas before their ex-
posure was perhaps unknown. Or (p. 621) “Alternatively, this result suggests that the Fed’s 
action, even though it provided no public money, may have been perceived in the market 
as an implicit extension of a TBTF [too-big-to-fail] policy.” 
Lessons Learned
The Federal Reserve has responded to ﬁ  nancial crises in a variety of ways. It has directly lent 
money to banks, such as the $45 billion lent in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. It has 
adjusted regulations, such as the time it relaxed Regulation Q in the wake of the Penn 
Central commercial paper scare. It has extended the trading hours of the Open Mar-
ket Desk, such as in the Drysdale Securities affair. And it has, in some cases, done noth-
ing more than watch cautiously. With the collapse of LTCM, ﬁ  nancial authorities had to 
choose between various containment options: doing nothing, orchestrating a recapital-
ization, or directly intervening. The resolution of LTCM has taught us three practical les-
sons for an era of increasing concentration among commercial banks, large hedge funds, 
and emerging private equity ﬁ  rms. 
Lesson 1: Context matters. Large losses at a ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm do not by themselves create a need for 
Federal Reserve action: there must be a systemic component. 
Though by all accounts it was not coincidence, LTCM collapsed when the markets were 
beset by other shocks. Greenspan, in his statement (p.23) explained: 
With credit spreads already elevated and the market prices of risky as-
sets under considerable downward pressure, Federal Reserve ofﬁ  cials 
moved more quickly to provide their good ofﬁ  ces to help resolve the 
affairs of LTCM than would have been the case in more normal times. If 
effect, the threshold of action was lowered by the knowledge that mar-
kets had recently become fragile.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Furthermore, because of LTCM’s complicated structure, the effect of its losses on the 
market was particularly hard to gauge, making the risk proportionately greater. Again, 
Greenspan (p.24) remarked: 
The scale and scope of LTCM’s operations, which encompassed many 
markets, maturities, and currencies and often relied on instruments that 
were thinly-traded and had prices that were not continuously quoted, 
made it exceptionally difﬁ  cult to predict broader ramiﬁ  cations of at-
tempting to close out its positions precipitately.
Brian Leach, of the oversight committee that unwound LTCM’s positions after the re-
capitalization, told Risk Magazine: “Everybody wanted a haircut because they only saw 
gross exposure, while internally we saw it as net exposure.” 
Lesson 2: Details matter.
The large derivative position of LTCM created additional problems. As mentioned above, 
derivatives have an exception to the usual automatic stay granted after bankruptcy. In 
the event of default, LTCM’s counterparties had the right to sell any of the fund’s assets 
in their control, potentially dumping even more assets onto the market, lowering prices 
still further. (Edwards, 1999) 
That the problem was resolved successfully depended, in a large part, on “the orderly 
continuation in the risk arbitrage business of the newly recapitalized LTCM” (Bank for 
International Settlements, 1999, p. 9) which in turn depended on getting the details of 
the recapitalization right. In the LTCM case it meant retaining the management, giving 
enough stake in the ﬁ  rm to provide an incentive for efﬁ  cient liquidation, and bringing in 
outside oversight.
Even after taking the intermediate step of “providing good ofﬁ  ces,” the amount and 
type of moral suasion had to be decided on. Each choice in turn faced trade-offs—what 
were the costs of doing nothing? What was the probability that markets would seize up? 
Was there a viable alternative? Would the intervention make further crises more likely?
Lesson 3: Look for the minimum effective intervention; or, work with the market, not against it.
Financial markets, despite their problems, are often very efﬁ  cient. The agreement to re-
capitalize LTCM resulted from a group of private ﬁ  rms recognizing it was in their inter-
est to infuse more capital. The market again was used to conduct an orderly unwinding 
of the ﬁ  rm’s positions. In fact, there is some evidence that even more reliance could have 
been placed on the market in the LTCM case. Stock prices and federal funds rates incor-
porated substantially correct information about exposures to LTCM. Fed intervention, 
despite its limited character, may have indeed increased moral hazard by increasing the 
perception of too-big-to-fail.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 19, APRIL 2007
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Applying these rules takes judgment and cannot be done mechanically. As the ﬁ  nancial 
system evolves, the situation changes. President Geithner, for example, argues (2006) that 
changes since LTCM have improved the stability and resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system, 
reducing the “probability of systemic events.” Those same changes, though, “may amplify 
the damage caused by and complicate the management of very severe ﬁ  nancial shocks.” 
These decisions have to be made quickly, and with imperfect information. In the end, the 
ﬁ  nal consequences may not be apparent until years later. Hopefully, though, keeping the 
past in mind will make the future that much easier to handle. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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